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Surface Mining Primacy for Kentucky:
The Legal Implications
BY MARCus P. McGRAw*
INTRODUCTION
Regulation of the environmental impact of surface coal min-
ing and the surface effects of underground coal mining in Ken-
tucky entered a new stage on May 18, 1982,1 when the U.S. Sec-
retary of the Interior, pursuant to his authority under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA),
2
granted the Commonwealth of Kentucky conditional approval of
its surface mining program. Approval not only transferred the
primary regulatory responsibility for enforcing environmental
laws concerning coal mining operations from the federal to the
state level but also created numerous legal issues and practical
problems for the state, coal operators, the federal government
and the public. This Article addresses the issues and problems
that arose as a result of this transfer of responsibility.
. An attorney with the law firm of Greenebaum Doll & McDonald, Lexington, Ken-
tucky; former Trial Attorney, Division of Mine, Health and Safety, Office of Solicitor,
U.S. Department of the Interior; former Assistant Solicitor for Litigation and Enforce-
ment, Division of Surface Mining, Office of Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior.
B.A. 1964, University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1967, George Washington University.
147 Fed. Beg. 21,404 (1982). On December 30, 1981, the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky resubmitted to the U.S. Department of the Interior its proposed permanent regula-
tory program under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter
cited as SMCRA]. This followed an initial approval in part and disapproval in part of the
proposed program by then Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus, which was published in
the Federal Register on October 22, 1980. 45 Fed. Beg. 69,940 (1980). For a complete dis-
cussion of the general background on the permanent program, the program approval pro-
cess. and the Kentucky program submission, see Id. at 69,940-42. The rules and legislative
provisions in Kentucky's initial submission were approved with the exceptions noted under
the heading "Secretary's Decision." Id. at 69,964-70.
Kentucky's resubmission was published in the Federal Register on January 7,
1982. See 47 Fed. Beg. 820 (1982). The formal conditional approval of Kentucky's pro-
gram by Secretary of the Interior James Watt contains voluminous findings and specifies
12 conditions to be met by Kentucky prior to unconditional approval. See 47 Fed. Beg.
21,404 and 21,433-34 (1982).
2 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1980). Authority for the Secretary's approval of
state programs is found at Id. § 1211(c)(1).
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I. THE INITIAL REGULATORY PROGRAM
SMCRA was the culmination of numerous congressional
hearings, seven bills passed by either the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives or the Senate, three Senate-House conference reports and
two presidential vetoes.3 When President Carter signed the final
version on August 3, 1977, he ended this tortuous legislative
battle as to whether and to what extent Congress could regulate
the environmental effects of surface and underground coal min-
ing in this country. One statutory feature which possibly contri-
buted to SMCRA's passage was the provision for a two-stage reg-
ulatory process in which the states would ultimately have an op-
portunity to run their own programs after an initial period of
federal involvement. Under SMCRA, the first stage of this two-
stage process, the "initial regulatory program,"' 4 involves dual
regulation whereby the U.S. Office of Surface Mining Reclama-
tion and Enforcement (OSM) 5 and the states independently reg-
ulate the environmental impacts of surface and underground
coal mining. I During this interim period, the Secretary of the In-
terior not only enforces federal interim performance standards
but also reviews the various proposed state programs to deter-
mine whether or not they meet the standards set forth in SMCRA
and whether the state has the ability to enforce the full range of
federal performance standards.7
Although the exact legal relationship among OSM, the states
and the coal industry during the interim program has been the
3 For a comprehensive history of the federal strip mining legislation, see D. THOMP-
SON & A. AGNEW, SURFACE MINING: FEDERAL RECULATION, Issue Brief No. IB74074, Li-
bary of Congress Cong. Research Service, Major Issues System, May 1, 1974, updated No-
vember 28, 1977.
4 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. 1980).
5 The Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement [hereinafter cited as
OSM] was established in the Department of the Interior by § 201 of the SMCRA. Id. §
1211. The acronym "OSM" was coined by the Department of the Interior in 1977.
6 During this initial regulatory period, both OSM and the states are authorized to
exercise enforcement of the new environmental performance standards which are re-
quired to be incorporated into operators permits. See id. § 1252(b) & (c). OSM's responsi-
bility is to enforce the federal performance standards which are implemented during the
interim period and to respond to any reasonable evidence of violations of these standards
by using the authority vested in the Secretary of the Interior to bring about compliance.
See id. §§ 1252(3) & 1271(a).
7 See id. § 1252(3); H.R. REp. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1977).
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subject of considerable disagreement, decisions of the Interior
Board of Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals 8 and the
courts9 have essentially put this controversy to rest. The states are
the permitting authority in the interim program, but the courts
and the Board have uniformly agreed that OSM has an indepen-
dent right and duty to enforce the federal performance standards
in the interim program, notwithstanding the frequently overlap-
ping and inconsistent actions of states and notwithstanding the
issuance of variances and exceptions to those standards by the
states.10 Despite coal operators' arguments to courts that they
were being whipsawed between the duplicative actions of the
state and OSM, courts have justified OSM's independent role on
the basis of legislative history which reflected a recognition by
Congress that some overlapping and inconsistent actions would
be unavoidable during the critical interim program." Under
SMCRA, this initial regulatory or interim program gives way to
the permanent regulatory program when the Secretary of the In-
terior either approves a state's surface mining program or pro-
mulgates and institutes a federal program in that state.12
8 This Board was established to hear appeals under SMCRA and is authorized to
speak finally for the Secretary of the Interior in various formal appeals. 43 C.F.R. §
4.1101(a) (1981).
9 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 270-
71 (1981); In re Surface Mining Regulations Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
affg in part, rev'g in part 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978); Union Carbide v. Andrus,
No. 79-2142 (S.D. W. Va. July 17,1979).
10 See the cases cited in note 9 supra. In Hodel, for example, the Supreme Court
stated:
States may also pursue their own regulatory and inspection programs during
the interim phase, and they may assist the Secretary in enforcing the interim
standards. The states are not, however, required to enforce the interim reg-
ulatory standards and, until the permanent phase of the program, the Secre-
tary may not cede the Federal Government's independent enforcement role
to states that wish to conduct their own regulatory programs.
452 U.S. at 270-71 (emphasis added).
11 See the cases cited in note 9 supra. In S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 57
(1977), it was stated:
The Committee recognizes that [the Act] may to some extent duplicate State
activity; however it is the view of the Committee that this sort of federal
presence at the most crucial time of the administration of this Act will result
in uniform, equitable enforcement of the interim standards and will assure
that the requirements of the Act get off to a good start.
12 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253 & 1254 (Supp. 1980).
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Pursuant to his authority to promulgate national regulations
to implement SMCRA,' 3 the Secretary of the Interior promul-
gated voluminous and complex regulations relating to the proce-
dures and criteria for approval or disapproval of state program
submissions." Essentially, these regulations do not allow the Sec-
retary to approve a state program unless it carries out the provi-
sions and the purposes of SMCRA and the implementing regula-
tions and unless the state demonstrates that it has the authority
under state laws and regulations to implement, administer and
enforce its laws.15 Further, the Secretary of the Interior is author-
ized to approve conditionally a state program where it is found to
have "minor" deficiencies, provided the state agrees to correct
such deficiencies within prescribed time periods and actually ini-
tiates and actively proceeds to correct the deficiencies.16
Secretary of the Interior James Watt announced his condi-
tional approval of Kentucky's surface mining program on April
13, 1982. Before this decision could become effective by publica-
tion in the Federal Register,1 a Kentucky state court entered a
restraining order enjoining Kentucky from enforcing the perma-
nent program. 8 The restraining order was eventually lifted, and
on May 18, 1982, Secretary Watt's conditional approval of Ken-
tucky's surface mining program became effective.19
13 Id. § 1211(c).
14 See 30 C.F.R. pt. 732 (1981). These regulations specified the type of review that
OSM would make of the states' submission, established notice and public hearing require-
ments, specified the time periods and manner in which the Secretary of the Interior would
approve or disapprove the state program, detailed the procedures for state program
amendments to the programs and stated the criteria for approval or disapproval of state
programs.
15 30 C.F.R. § 732.15 (1981).
16 30 C.F.R. § 732.13(i) (1981)..
17 30 C.F.R. § 732.13(h) (1981).
18 Morris v. Kentucky, No. 82-CI-143 (Johnson Cir. Ct., Ky. Apr. 13, 1982). The or-
der also required Kentucky to continue accepting interim program permit applications,
enjoined any action which would result in the imposition of a federal program, enjoined
the issuance of regulations without following procedures for non-emergency promulgation
of regulations and, finally, enjoined the promulgation of regulations inconsistent with or
more stringent than federal permit program regulations. See id.
19 The suit was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs after negotiations among plain-
tiffs, officials of the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Pro-
tection and OSM officials.
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II. WHAT IS PRIMACY?
Having obtained conditional approval of its program, Ken-
tucky achieved the much-heralded and long-awaited goal of
"primacy."20 As the primary regulatory entity, the state took on
an entirely new role. This new role was described by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals:
In an approved and properly enforced state program, the
state has the primary responsibility for achieving the purposes
of the Act. First, the state is the sole issuer of permits. In per-
forming this centrally important duty, the state regulatory au-
thority decides who will mine in what areas, how long they
may conduct mining operations, and under what conditions
the operations will take place. See Act §§ 506, 510. It decides
whether a permittee's [sic] technique for avoiding environ-
mental degradation are sufficient and whether the proposed
reclamation plan is acceptable. Act § 510(b). The state sets the
amount of the bond to be posted by the operator, and inspects
the mine to determine compliance. §§ 509, 517. When permit
conditions are violated, the state is charged with imposing ap-
propriate penalties. Act § 518(i).
Finally, it is with an approved state law and with state
regulations consistent with the Secretary's that surface mine
operators must comply See Act § 503(a), 518(i). Administra-
tive and judicial appeals of permit decisions are matters of
state jurisdiction in which the Secretary plays no role. Act §
514.21
The role of OSM in a state with an approved program is one
of oversight. Section 517(a) of SMCRA requires occasional on-
site inspections "to evaluate the administration of approved state
programs."' ' If a state fails to take "appropriate action" after no-
tification by OSM, the agency is required to inspect and to take
20 The term "primacy" is not a statutory or regulatory term but is believed to have
been coined by OSM during the state program approval process. It denotes the condition
whereby a state becomes the "pnmary" regulatory entity vis-A-vis OSM as opposed to its
former dual role with OSM.
21 In re Permanent Surface Mimng Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981) (footnote omitted).
2 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a) (Supp. 1980).
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appropriate enforcement action.A3 Once a state program is ap-
proved, OSM is still obliged to monitor the state's performance
and where there is a breakdown in the state enforcement, OSM
may take over the state program in whole or in part.24
The state's independence in the permit program contrasts
with the continuing role of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, after a
state has assumed responsibility for pollution discharge permits.A
5
Under that statute, the EPA Administrator has veto power over
individual permit decisions by states that have primacy under
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. Under
SMCRA, the Secretary of the Interior retains no veto power or
other control over the issuance of a permit by a state with an ap-
proved surface mining program. The only authority that the Sec-
retary has in this regard is either to take independent enforce-
ment action against a coal operator pursuant to section 521(a) of
SMCRA26 after affording the state an opportunity to take action
23 Id. § 1271(a). For a description of the relationship between OSM and the states in
the permanent program, see H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 131-32 (1977).
24 30 U.S.C. §§ 1254(b) & 1271(b) (Supp. 1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1977).
25 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1980)). Un-
der that statute, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has veto
power over individual decisions by states that have primacy under the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System. Under the Water Pollution Act, states which have the
capacity to administer a permit program may be delegated the authority to issue permits
for discharges into the navigable waters within their jurisdiction. However, no permit
may be issued from a state agency if the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency objects. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5) (Supp. 1980).
Each state with a permit program is required to forward to the agency a copy of
each permit application and to give notice of all actions which the state iakes related to the
permit application. Id. § 1342(d)(1) (1976). If the Administrator objects to the issuance of
the permit within 90 days, either because the proposed permit violates the Act or because
its issuance by the state may affect water quality in another state, no permit may issue. Id.
§ 1342(d)(2) (Supp. 1980). However, the Administrator may waive the agency's right to
object to the issuance of a permit in a number of situations. Id. § 1342(d)(3).
When the Administrator objects to the issuance of a permit, a public hearing is re-
quired to be held regarding such objections if the state requests the same. The Administra-
tor may issue the permit if the state fails to request a hearing within 90 days of the date of
objections or if the state fails to submit a revised permit meeting such objections within 30
days following completion of the hearing. Id. § 1342(d)(4).
2' 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (Supp. 1980).
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or to take control of all or a part of the state's permanent pro-
gram pursuant to sections 504(b) 27 and 521(b).28
While SMCRA authorizes a limited oversight role for OSM in
a state which has attained primacy, the exact relationship among
OSM, the state and the operators in that state has not thus far
been precisely delineated by either judicial decision or regula-
tion. Existing OSM permanent program regulations set forth
general enforcement rules for OSM in state-approved pro-
grams,29 but the details of how this will work in practice have not
yet emerged. OSM is currently developing procedures for OSM
inspectors who perform oversight functions in the permanent
program.30 For its oversight role, OSM statistically samples min-
ing operations to evaluate the performance of the state regula-
tory authority. OSM currently is statistically sampling in all
states with primacy.3' The number of coal operators selected for
sampling depends upon the total number of operators in that
state and, thus far, the information gathered during the inspec-
tions is merely sent to OSM headquarters in Washington and is
"analyzed" there for possible use.a2 No evidence is yet available as
to how OSM will utilize any statistical information it obtains in
Kentucky.
Generally, when OSM conducts an oversight inspection in
Kentucky, it does so jointly with the Kentucky inspector, unless
the state declines the invitation to join OSM. a3 When a violation
27 Id. § 1254(b).
28 Id. § 1271(b). The procedure for such a takeover of all or part of a state's program
is contained in 30 C.F.R. pt. 843 (1981).
2 30 C.F.R. pt. 843 (1981).
30 OSM has developed a document entitled Plans and Procedures For the Evaluation
of the States' Permanent Programs. This document, finalized on March 5, 1982, contains
both general oversight information as well as a description of the systems review of ap-
proved state programs. While this document is still in draft form, it discloses the type of
"oversight" OSM intends to perform. OSM intends to statistically sample randomly se-
lected mines to review each state function at that mine from permit issuance through total
bond release. OSM will then make inferences about the state's regulatory performance
and take action accordingly. OSM will also monitor state program data including permits,
state inspection reports, notices of bond release and the results of citizen complaint investi-
gation.
31 Telephone interview with Carl Pavetto, Chief, Branch of Inspection, Office of
Surface Mining, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1982).
32 Id.
33 Id.
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is observed during an oversight inspection, OSM will give the
state the ten-day notice pursuant to section 521(a)(1) of SM-
CRA.34 However, OSM's ability to follow up this ten-day notice
in the event the state fails to take "appropriate action" may be
seriously hampered by its proposed reinterpretation of its over-
sight enforcement authority following the change of administra-
tions in Washington.-"
III. PHASE-IN OF NEW STATE LAW
Several states which have attained primacy have been con-
fronted with the issue of when the various parts of the new state
laws go into effect after the Secretary of the Interior approves
them, but have yet to fully implement their permanent program
provisions for inspections, enforcement or performance stan-
dards.3s
Although Kentucky began using its new enforcement author-
ity immediately upon attaining primacy, it has taken the position
that the permanent program performance standards do not
apply to operators in Kentucky until the state has issued individ-
4 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1) (Supp. 1980).
35 During the Carter administration, OSM interpreted §§ 521(a)(1) and 521(a)(3) of
SMCRA as authorizing it to issue notices of violation against operators if a state with pri-
macy failed to take "appropriate action" after notification by OSM. 30 C.F.R. § 843.12
(1981). See also 44 Fed. Beg. 15,302 (1979) (preamble to the regulation). However, the
Reagan administration issued proposed regulations which reflected a new interpretation
in which no notice of violation could be issued by OSM during oversight inspections, even
if the state failed to take appropriate action after notification. 47 Fed. Reg. 17,269 (1982).
The author is advised by OSM that although OSM has recently suspended this proposed
regulation, the office continues to refrain from issuing any notices of violation during over-
sight because of this new interpretation. Telephone interview with Carl Pavetto, Chief,
Branch of Inspections, Office of Surface Mining, Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1982).
36 MINE REC. & PRODUCTIvITY REP., July 16, 1982, at 1. For example, Virginia has
apparently taken the position that its new permanent program enforcement provisions do
not apply until all of the state's coal operators obtain permanent program permits. Id.
Currently, only a handful of Virginia's operators have obtained program permits and offi-
cials there say it could take at least a year before the task is completed. Id. Consequently,
Virginia has fallen back on its pre-primacy law with regard to inspection and enforcement
which means that it cannot issue notices of violation or cessation orders against operators,
but rather must issue "special orders" which carry no monetary penalties and create no
particular deterrent effect. Id. As a result, OSM has dispatched additional inspectors to
the Virginia coal fields to begin direct enforcement action on the theory the state is misin-
terpreting its own plan. Id.
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ual operators permanent program permits. 37 For some coal oper-
ators this could mean that the permanent program standards do
not begin to apply for many months after primacy. Kentucky
will thus continue to enforce its interim program performance
standards until that time. OSM, in its oversight capacity, must
likewise enforce Kentucky's interim program law since the fed-
eral interim and permanent program regulations no longer apply
after Kentucky achieved primacy. 8 Federal regulations provide,
however, that the performance standards shall be effective and
shall apply to each operation "on the earliest date upon which
the Act and this Chapter require a permit to be obtained."39 Fed-
eral law requires that the permanent program permits be ac-
quired within eight months after primacy goes into effect before
one can operate, except for those persons who operate pursuant
to an interim program permit and have made timely and com-
plete application for a permanent program permit. 40 Therefore,
at least as far as federal law is concerned, some operators in states
with primacy must comply with the new performance standards
whether or not they have their new state permanent program
permits.
Another legal wrinkle regarding the phase-in of the new state
programs is that some states' interim program statutes and reg-
ulations, including Kentucky's, automatically expire when the
state obtains primacy. 4' Since Kentucky's interim program law
automatically expired when Kentucky attained primacy on May
18, 1982, if the new primacy laws cannot be made binding on
operators until incorporated into their permits, there would seem
to be a serious question as to Kentucky's ability to enforce any
performance standards against operators in Kentucky until that
operator had been issued a permanent program permit. A similar
situation would exist where primacy has occurred but where the
state has been enjoined from implementing primacy. This situa-
37 Telephone interview with Charles Gault, Office of Field Solicitor, Division of
Surface Mining, Region II, Knoxville, Tennessee (June 2, 1982).
38 See KY. REV. STAT. § 350.010 compiler's notes (Bobbs-Merrill Interim Supp. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as KRS].
39 30 C.F.R. § 701.11(c) (1981(.
40 Id. §§ 771.11 & 771.13(b) (1981).
41 See KRS § 350.010 compiler's notes (Interim Supp. 1982).
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tion was averted in Kentucky when the plaintiffs withdrew a suit
against the state which had resulted in the issuance of a restrain-
ing order by the Johnson Circuit Court.
42
IV. OSM REGULATION CHANGES AND INTERPRETATIONS
AND THEIR EFFECT UPON KENTUCKY'S PROGRAM
Since the change of administration in Washington, OSM has
been engaged in a massive overhaul of its permanent program
regulations. This regulation rewrite was ordered by Secretary of
the Interior James Watt and is now approaching its conclusion as
more and more surface mining regulations become final. While
this regulation rewrite process has been hampered somewhat by
OSM staffing problems and litigation,"4 OSM regulations of
major importance continue to change and, in many cases, are be-
ing made less stringent."4 This regulation re-write, and resulting
change in stringency, will become increasingly significant in
states such as Kentucky where the legislature has prohibited state
rules and regulations from being any more stringent than federal
law. 4 Thus, when a new OSM regulation becomes final, oper-
ators and others in states such as Kentucky must analyze it to as-
certain whether it is less stringent than its state counterpart and
to what extent. Even if a new federal regulation is deemed to be
less stringent than its state counterpart, Kentucky cannot auto-
matically conform its law to the less-stringent federal provisions.
4 -For a discussion of the restraining order issued by the Johnson Circuit Court, see
notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
43 A suit was filed by several environmental groups in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia alleging that OSM's massive re-write of the permanent program reg-
ulations was invalid due to a failure by OSM to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, No. 82-0320 (D.D.C. 1980). This suit has
now been settled. Under the terms of this settlement, OSM is to prepare a cumulative en-
vironmental impact statement (EIS) for approximately 80% of the regulations being re-
vised. The remainder of the regulations OSM intends to revise may be promulgated with-
out the preparation of an EIS. The rules to be covered in the EIS will include permitting,
subsidence, roads, excess spoil, remining, alluvial valley floors, hydrology, impound-
ments, experimental practices, prime farmlands, revegetation, backfilling and grading,
auger mining, coal processing plants, exploration, OSM oversight, lands unsuitable for
mining, sedimentation ponds and explosives. These rules will be held up approximately 90
days while the EIS process goes forward. Thirteen other proposed regulations will go for-
ward without an EIS provided an environmental assessment is done.
44 See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 12,088; 12,596; 12,760; 13,466; 13,535 and 16,152 (1982).
45 See generally KRS § 350.028 (Interim Supp. 1982).
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Kentucky statutes and regulations do not prescribe what will
occur when federal law changes. Presumably, once it becomes
apparent that a federal standard is less stringent than its Ken-
tucky counterpart, state rulemaking will have to take place. In
the interim, Kentucky coal operators may be asked to comply
with a state regulation more stringent than its federal counter-
part notwithstanding the state law prohibiting such action. It is
unclear as to what extent Kentucky could enforce the more strin-
gent state regulations in such a case. Also, coal operators and the
Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cab-
inet46 may very well disagree on the extent to which the OSM rule
change is more stringent than its state counterpart, if at all.
In addition to OSM rule changes, coal operators and others
also should keep apprised of regulation changes by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency because SMCRA may not supersede,
amend, modify or repeal a Federal Water Pollution Control Act47
provision and Kentucky regulations may not be more stringent
than SMCRA. For example, OSM and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency are looking to ease effluent standards for oper-
ators desiring to re-work previously-mined lands. 48 Additionally,
the Environmental Protection Agency is in the process of chang-
ing its rules relating to credits for pollutants in intake water. 49 As
in the case of relaxation of OSM regulations, coal operators may
wish to assert the no-more-stringent argument after any relax-
ation of Environmental Protection Agency regulations relating to
coal operations.
In addition to the relaxation of OSM and Environmental
Protection Agency regulations relating to coal operators, new de-
cisions by courts and by the Interior Board of Surface Mining and
Reclamation Appeals (IBSMA)5° interpreting SMCRA or OSM
46 The cabinet was formerly known as the Kentucky Department for Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Protection.
47 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (Supp. 1980).
48 MiNE REC. & PRODUCTIVITY REP., July 16, 1982.
4 9 Seegeneraly 40 C.F.R. § 122.63(g) (1981).
50 The Interior Board of Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals has jurisdiction to
exercise the final decision making power of the Secretary under SMCRA pertaining to, in-
ter alia, applications for review of notices of violation and cessation orders, proceedings
for the suspension or revocation of permits and appeals from orders or decisions of Depart-
1982-83]
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regulations may have a bearing on new state programs. Federal
courts and the IBSMA have issued significant decisions relating
to OSM jurisdiction over loading facilities and processing
plants.5' Since the IBSMA is authorized to exercise final decision-
making authority for the Secretary of the Interior in administra-
tive adjudicatory appeals relating to surface mining,5 2 these deci-
sions interpreting such issues as OSM's jurisdiction over process-
ing plants and similar facilities accordingly represent the Secre-
tary's interpretation of OSM regulations. Thus, IBSMA's deci-
sions may provide an argument that a contrasting and more
stringent interpretation by Kentucky violates the no-more-strin-
gent provision of the Kentucky Surface Mining Act. 5
V. CHANGES IN STATE LAW AFTER PRIMACY
Many states which have received primacy from the Depart-
ment of the Interior have begun revising their primacy laws or
are considering revisions. At least one state began this process
after its program had been submitted to the Department of the
Interior but before its program had been approved. 4 Revisions
are motivated partly by experience gained after primacy, partly
as a reaction to OSM changes in its own regulations and partly by
the new OSM "state window" provision which arguably facil-
itates revisions as long as states can show their new provision is
"as effective as" the parallel federal provision.s Generally speak-
ment of the Interior administrative law judges who hear surface mining cases. 43 C.F.R.
§ 4.1101 (1981).
51 See Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, No. 80-M-0829 (N.D. Ala. April 20, 1981);
Dinco Coal Sales, Inc., 4 IBSMA 35 (1982) r'vsd, No. 82-99 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 1982);
Reitz Coal Co., 3 IBSMA 260 (1981). These decisions are at variance with a previous opin-
ion by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in In re Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litig., No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. 1980), appeals docketed, Nos. 80-1810,
80-1811, 80-1812 and 80-1813 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 1980) and No. 80-1823 (D.C. Cir. July
18, 1980).
52 For a description of the authority and functions of the board, see note 50 supra.
5 See KRS § 350.028 (Interim Supp. 1982).
54 Pennsylvania started revising its permanent program surface mining regulations
before they had been approved by Secretary of the Interior Watt. Telephone interview
with John Woodrum, Field Solicitor, O.S.M. Region I, U.S. Department of the Interior
(June 2, 1982).
' 5 46 Fed. Reg. 16,592 (1982) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 732.14).
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ing, however, all states may perceive a need to "fine tune" their
programs once they gain some on-the-ground experience with
their new statutes and regulations. In West Virginia, for
example, the state rewrote its coal refuse regulations shortly after
approval of its primacy program. Accordingly, it revised those
regulations and submitted them to OSM for approval.
Revisions may create major confusion for coal operators,
state regulators, mining consultants and the public. Assuming
that states formally revise their regulations, OSM must still con-
duct a second rulemaking of its own with the requisite notice and
public comment before it can approve the change 7 The proce-
dures, time schedules and criteria used by OSM in considering a
revision are the same as those used by the state and found in 30
C.F.R. sections 732.12, 732.13 and 732.15. 8 This slow and te-
dious process could leave states, the industry and the public in
limbo for long periods of time because changes in laws or regula-
tions are not effective in that state until approved by OSM as a
formal program amendment, unless state regulation changes are
made contingent upon approval by OSM. 9
The situation may be analogous to revisions of state imple-
mentation plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act. 60 The Environ-
mental Protection Agency has been notoriously slow in approv-
ing SIP revisions under the Clean Air Act because it must con-
duct its own rulemaking on such revisions. In an attempt to deal
with this problem, the Environmental Protection Agency devised
"interim final rulemaking" and "parallel processing."' 1 "Interim
final rulemaking" allows a SIP change to become effective imme-
diately after the Environmental Protection Agency has finished
its rulemaking process. "Parallel processing" enables state and
federal rulemaking to occur simultaneously in order to expedite
the SIP revision process.62 However, while these regulatory de-
56 Telephone interview with John Woodrum, Field Solicitor, O.S.M. Region I, U.S.
Department of the Interior (June 2, 1982).
57 30 C.F.R. § 732.17 (1981).
5 Id. § 732.17(a)(2).
59 Id. § 732.17(g).
6' 42 U.S.C. H8 7401-626 (Supp. 1980).
61 See 12 ENwT REP. (BNA) 212, 376 and 579 (1981-82). See also 46 Fed. Reg. 44,476
(1981).
62 See 46 Fed. Reg. 44,476 (1981).
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
vices may speed the SIP revision process, the process is still cum-
bersome since it has been held that the only procedural routes
available to modify a federally-approved SIP are revision pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. section 7410(a)(3)6 or postponement pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. section 7410(f), 64 both of which require approval of
the Environmental Protection Agency. 6
Other cases relating to SIP revisions under the Clean Air Act
have made it clear that the original state regulation as adopted in
its SIP and approved by the Environmental Protection Agency
continues to be enforceable until such time as a revision of that
regulation is submitted and approved by that agency. 6 In anal-
ogizing the Clean Air Act to the Surface Mining Act, states with
surface mining primacy might face long and frustrating delays in
obtaining OSM approval of state regulation or statutory changes
before they can implement and enforce these changes. This delay
between adoption of a revision of state law and federal approval
of the revision promises to create major confusion and friction.
States with surface mining primacy can avoid this time-con-
suming approval process by OSM and their own state rulemaking
agency by using policy memoranda in lieu of statute or regula-
tion changes. Law interpretation or change by policy memo-
randa apparently has proliferated without any strong OSM ob-
jection. The Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet has used policy memoranda since achieving
primacy over its surface mining program by periodically publish-
ing a "Reclamation Advisory Memorandum."67 These memo-
randa range in topic from status reports on various efforts being
undertaken by the Natural Resources Cabinet to substantive
changes in departmental surface mining interpretations. As an
example of the latter, Reclamation Advisory Memorandum No.
63 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a3) (1980).
64 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o (1980).
6 Illinois v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 490 F. Supp. 1145, 1154 (D. I. 1980).
66 Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 419 F. Supp. 528,533 (D.D.C.
1976). See also 490 F. Supp. at 1153; Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v.
Department of Economic Dev., 373 F. Supp. 1096, 1100 (D.D.C. 1973).
67 These memoranda provide advice, interpretations and instructions to coal oper-
ators, coal operator associations, consulting engineers and division personnel. They are not
formal regulations and have not gone through the state rulemaking process.
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3311 redefines coal processing operations and loading facilities
and specifies which facilities fall under the jurisdiction of the
Kentucky surface mining law. On the basis of the discussion and
interpretation contained in this advisory memorandum, oper-
ators of such facilities are presumably required either to obtain a
permit, to remain permitted or to apply for cancellation of an
existing permit. However, such a matter more properly should be
the subject of a formal departmental regulation after notice and
an opportunity for public comment is provided. 9
Kentucky's use of reclamation policy memoranda has several
legal implications. First, it will be difficult for operators to know
precisely which law to follow. While the state may be enforcing
its reclamation advisory memoranda, OSM in its oversight capa-
city may be enforcing merely the state regulation and statute. A
more serious problem is that state notices of noncompliance and
cessation orders written on the basis of interpretations in the ad-
visory memoranda may be unenforceable because the memo-
randa were not promulgated in accordance with state rulemak-
ing requirements 70 and have not received OSM's approval as a
program amendment.
71
VI. LEGAL CHALLENGE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR'S
APPROVAL OF THE KENTUCKY PROGRAM
Section 526(a)(1) of SMCRA72 authorizes judicial review of
6 Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (now
known as Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet), Reclamation Advis-
ory Memorandum No. 33 (April 27, 1982).
9 A "regulation" is defined in KRS § 13.080(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982) as including sub-
stantive procedural and interpretive rules as well as the amendment or repeal of a prior
regulation. A "regulation" does not include statements concerning only the internal man-
agement of an administrative body and not affecting private rights or procedures available
to the public. See id.
70 State agency regulations are considered effective and binding only if they have
been promulgated in accordance with all the required rulemaking procedures set forth in
KRS ch. 13. See Ziegler, A Primer on Administrative Rules and Rule-Making in Kentucky,
67 KY. L.J. 103, 109 (1978-79). See also Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. Berry, 487
S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ky. 1972) (Court refused to take judicial notice of regulation due to its
incorrect citation of the authority pursuant to which it was adopted); Kentucky State Bd.
of Business Schools v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., 453 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Ky.
1970) (Court stated in dictum that for a rule to be valid it must be issued pursuant to
proper procedure).
71 See 30 C.F.R. § 732.17 (1981).
72 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (Supp. 1980).
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any decision by the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disap-
prove a state program. On July 16, 1982, several environmental
and citizens groups filed a major suit against the Secretary of the
Interior and state officials in a federal district court in Ken-
tucky.73 The groups seek a declaration that Secretary Watt's ap-
proval of the Kentucky program is invalid because it fails to meet
SMCRA requirements. The suit also seeks an order requiring: (1)
the state to correct alleged deficiencies; (2) the Interior Depart-
ment to institute a federal program within sixty days if the state
fails to correct these deficiencies, and (3) the Secretary of the
Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cab-
inet to stay any administrative hearing which entails issuing a
permit containing any of the alleged deficiencies.74
The suit should not have any present impact upon the state's
implementation of the permanent program since it does not ap-
pear to request any immediate injunctive relief against either the
state or the Interior Department. Thus, the permanent program
should continue unaffected by this litigation until the court ren-
ders a final decision or until the parties work out a settlement.
The long-term significance of the case is that, at least with
regard to several of the issues, a settlement by the parties or a de-
cision that the Secretary improperly approved part of the Ken-
tucky program would set in motion a new series of legislative
changes or rulemaking revisions. The changes or revisions would
then be followed by a submission to OSM, federal rulemaking75
and ultimately a new decision by the Secretary regarding Ken-
tucky's program. Federal and state laws are silent as to the legal
status of those portions of Kentucky's program which are held to
be improperly approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The re-
73 Sierra Club, Cumberland Chapter v. Watt, No. 82-30 (E.D. Ky. July 16, 1982).
4 Id. The alleged defects in the Kentucky program identified in the suit include the
following: Kentucky will have insufficient personnel for the inspection and enforcement of
its law, the program fails to provide for immediate issuance of cessation orders by inspec-
tors, the Kentucky program's provision for regulation of coal preparation and crushing fa-
cilities is inconsistent with federal law, and the program fails to require that existing struc-
tures which fail to meet permanent program performance standards be modified or recon-
structed with six months to meet both performance and design standards. Id., slip op. at 9-
10.
75 See generally 30 C.F.R. § 732.17 (1981).
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sulting confusion as to the enforceability of those provisions dur-
ing this interim period would provide further instability to Ken-
tucky's program at a critical juncture in its development.
VII. INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STATES AFTER PRIMACY
Officials in a number of states were enjoined by their own
courts from submitting or resubmitting their surface mining pro-
grams to OSM during the interim program. While these injunc-
tions were pending, OSM took the position that it was unable to
institute a federal program in those states because of the lan-
guage of section 1253(d) of SMCRA. 76 After the expiration or dis-
solution of the injunctions these states joined others which had
submitted or resubmitted programs to OSM. However, in at least
two instances, injunctions were obtained against states after the
Secretary of the Interior approved their programs.77 The
anomalous result in West Virginia, where the injunction was is-
sued against part of the state's program, was that the state con-
tinued to enforce its interim program while OSM treated the
state as being a permanent program. This put OSM in an over-
sight rather than an independent regulatory position.
In Kentucky, a preliminary injunction was entered against
the state enjoining it from enforcing the permanent program,
promulgating any permanent program regulations without first
going through normal rulemaking procedures or promulgating
regulations inconsistent with or more stringent than federal reg-
ulations.78 The plaintiffs have now withdrawn this suit. Had the
injunction continued, however, or in the event future injunctions
are issued against the state, questions concerning the status of
Kentucky's program become important. Since Kentucky's in-
76 30 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (Supp. 1980). This section provides, in part:
[T]he inability of a State to take any action the purpose of which is to pre-
pare, submit or enforce a State program, or any portion thereof, because the
action is enjoined by the issuance of an injunction by any court of competent
jurisdiction shall not result in ... the imposition of a Federal program.
Id. See also 30 C.F.R. § 730.12 (1981) (implementing 30 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (Supp. 1980)).
77 These states were Kentucky and West Virginia.
78 For a more complete discussion of this suit, see notes 18-19 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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terim program regulations automatically expired upon pri-
macy, 7' the state would seem to have no enforceable law if its
current surface mining law were struck down or if the state were
barred from implementing it. Additionally, if Kentucky had
been required to replace its emergency regulations with regula-
tions which had gone through regular rulemaking, 0 this process
would have taken months to complete. Moreover, if the non-
emergency regulations had come out differently than those orig-
inally submitted to OSM, the agency would have had to treat
these new regulations as a program amendment under 30 C.F.R
section 732.17, which would cause many more months of delay.
As the new primacy states begin implementing and enforcing
their new laws, additional legal challenges may be brought to
those laws in state courts on constitutional, procedural or other
grounds. If a state's new regulations are enjoined in state court,
the question arises as to whether OSM may enforce the state reg-
ulations or the state may enforce the state program as part offed-
eral law. In People v. Celotex Corporation,8' a federal district
court addressed such an issue under the Clean Air Act. 2 After the
Illinois state court had invalidated the state regulations because
of procedural deficiencies, Illinois and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency sought to enforce portions of the Illinois state im-
plementation plan as part of federal law. They argued that al-
though the regulations were unenforceable in state court, they
were enforceable in a federal court since the state court action
was a "modification" of the state implementation plan. Further-
more, they argued that the regulations remained in place until
approved by the Environmental Protection Agency. However,
the district court held that the invalidated regulations were un-
enforceable in federal courts as part of the federal Clean Air
Act. 3
71 See KRS § 350.010 compiler's notes (Interim Supp. 1982).
s3 The state had used its emergency rulemaking authority to implement its interim
program regulations and had never replaced these emergency regulations with regulations
which had been promulgated by the regular notice and public comment procedure.
81 516 F. Supp. 716 (D. Ill. 1981).
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1980).
83 516 F. Supp. at 718-19.
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If a parallel ruling were made with respect to enjoined state
surface mining programs, OSM's only recourse would seem to be
the implementation of a federal program in order to take over
that portion of the state's program which had been enjoined or
invalidated. 4 Such an action by OSM would cause confusion, if
not chaos, in a state such as Kentucky because it would take
months, even years, for OSM to gear up for inspections of the
large number of Kentucky mines. Furthermore, the drafting and
promulgation of a federal program in Kentucky would be
lengthy and complicated, creating a great deal of confusion for
coal operators who need stable regulation to plan and operate ef-
ficiently.
CONCLUSION
As might be expected with any federal-state regulatory pro-
gram, the transition to state primacy invariably causes great dis-
ruption and confusion and raises innumerable legal and practical
questions and problems. The transition from the interim to the
permanent program in Kentucky is certainly no exception.
Whether all of these legal questions and problems can be resolved
remains to be seen.
84 See generaUy 30 U.S.C. §§ 1254(b) & 1271(b) (Supp. 1980).
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